Robert Peston has published a thoughtful piece today on the bonus culture for bankers.
The problem with bonuses arises where people are paid hefty sums to reward what initially looks like success - selling bucketloads of new mortgages, for example - but later turns sour, when the mortgage holders can't keep up their payments. By then it's too late: the bankers have pocketed their bonus and the bank's shareholders end up with the losses.
Peston suggests that:
A genuine reform of the bonus-culture, one that would really put the kibosh on bankers taking foolish risks, would re-introduce the concept of the "malus" - or the idea that when a firm does badly, or a deal goes bad, the partners (in this case the de-facto partners, the top executives) take a hit and suffer a permanent diminution of wealth.
An interesting idea, but a difficult one to accomplish. You can read Peston's thoughts in full
here.
A bonus scheme for employees or executives is a great idea when it encourages work that generates more profits for the business in the medium to long term. But instead it usually focuses behaviour on actions that generate bonuses for the employee
now; that's not necessarily the same thing as bringing long term benefits to the business. In hitting their target they can incur bad debts, service quality could be reduced or other problems may follow.
The way to avoid this with a bonus scheme is to align the interests of the employees with those of the business owners. It appears that this has been achieved with the
John Lewis Partnership model, but not many business owners seem to want to adopt that route. Employee share ownership plans may also work - these are best for listed companies - as may payment of a straight profit share. But it's difficult to target them on outstanding contributions by particular individuals rather than paying out across the board to all employees.
BBC Radio 4 has a programme, More or Less - currently off the air - which in its last series looked at a bankers' bonus question. So many listeners challenged the answer that they added the following explanation to
their website:
A trader enters a bank where everyone else is doing exactly the same trade and that trade has a 50% chance of making a profit. The trader knows of a trade that has a 75% chance of making a profit.
But in order for the individual trader to get his bonus, two things have to happen: the bank has to make a profit and the individual trader has to make a profit.
If the trader does his good trade, the probability of him getting his bonus is the chance of his trade making a profit - ie 75% - multiplied by the chance of the bank making a profit - ie 50%.
His chance of getting a bonus is therefore 37.5%. However if he does the same as everyone else, his chance of getting a bonus is 50%.
Some listeners asked why the trader's chance of making a profit if he did the same trade as everyone else was not 25% (ie 50% x 50%).
The answer is that the 50 per cent strategy is perfectly correlated with the bank's profitability, while the 75 per cent strategy is perfectly uncorrelated.
When the probabilities are perfectly uncorrelated, 75% x 50% is the right calculation to work out if the trader gets his bonus.
When the strategies are perfectly correlated, either both the trader and the bank make money, or neither the trader nor the bank make money.
Make sense to you? Me neither. It just goes to show how any bonus scheme can have unexpected and unintended consequences. I am sometimes asked to help design bonus schemes for businesses. I think that basic pay linked to performance through regular appraisals works better.